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During the past decades, PSC has developed rapidly and achieved series of 
remarkable achievements. However, because of the regional mode since its 
beginning, there have been lots of drawbacks existing in the current PSC system. For 
example, regional development is unbalanced, adopting different inspection 
standards. Lack of regional cooperation and data sharing lead to the vessels 
inspected repeatedly. Corruption is serious in some developing countries. In this case, 
this research endeavors to find out solutions to these problems. 
 
Most of the studies focus on the effectiveness of PSC inspection. Few researches 
engage in the supervision of PSC. Therefore, the author sets up a PSC performance 
evaluation regime (PSC PER), based on other types of performance assessment 
system. After the analysis of the key factors contribute to regime, the framework of 
PSC PER can consist of three main index subsets. Each indicator is given the 
weighting points by synthesized experts’ opinions. Finally, a BGW-list of PSC 
performance appears and classifies the PSC authorities in Tokyo MoU, according to 
the historic data.  
 
Two kinds of approaches are used to verify the model of PSC PER. One is the data 
of a classification society. Another is to compare two sample groups by the method 
of random sampling. Both of them prove the rationality and feasibility of PSC PER. 
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The application prospect of the regime is discussed in the last Chapter 
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Chapter 1 Introduction 
1.1 Background 
Today is the time of global economic integration. Each country needs the 
commodities from all over the world to develop their economies and people like the 
products with high quality made by other countries. However, most of the 
merchandise trade still use the seaborne way which has continued for hundreds of 
years. Generally, more than 90 percent of the global trade is carried by vessels 
(Maritime Knowledge Centre, 2012). The volumes of international seaborne trade had 
the total to nearly 9.6 billion tons by 2013, which was about 3.6 times than that ones 
in 1970 (United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, 2014). See Table 
1.1. Therefore, the continuous development of marine transportation has driven the 




Table 1.1 Developments in international seaborne trade, selected years (Millions 
of tons loaded) 
 
Source: UNCTAD. (2014). Review of maritime transport 2014. Geneva: Author. 
 
Billions of tones cargo transported by sea means the value with billions of dollars 
comes from marine industry. As the management agencies, the international 
organizations like International Maritime Organization (IMO) and the maritime 
administrations from each country own great power, because they make the rules of 
game and supervise the running of the industry. However, there are fewer measures 
to restrict the power which is owned by the leaders of industry. No one likes a sharp 
sword hung on his head; especially the one which is the rule maker. But it will bring 
a series of serious problems, if the power is excess and out of control. Some 
measures should be used to supervise the function running in the authorities. Port 
state control (PSC), as one of the most important work, should be monitored either. 
 
PSC is a kind of ship safety inspection carried out by maritime authorities to the 
vessels hung foreign flag, in order to control the safety of vessel and prevent the 
pollution to the environment. It is called the second line of defense to eliminate the 
substandard ships sailing on the seven seas (Knapp & Franses, 2008), while the flag 
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state control is the first line. Even though it develops rapidly in the recent decades 
and plays a more and more important role in the shipping industry, there are still 
some issues existing in its management system. 
 
Corruption is one of the serious problems. According to the complaint of crew, 
corruption of Port State Control Officers (PSCO) widely appears in the Southeast 
Asia, South America, East Europe and Africa. They always try to earn the benefits 
from vessels by using their power in hands. For example, if the captain pays a 
certain amount of money or gives some cigarettes or wine, the PSCOs will issue a 
clear PSC report or write less serious deficiencies, which helps the vessel to gain a 
good record and reduce the target risk factor in the PSC database. In some countries, 
the PSCOs even threaten the seafarers to give more deficiencies, if they can not get 
the satisfying reward. 
 
This phenomenon can exist for a long time, because the PSCOs have the great power. 
Once the ship is detained due to the detainable deficiencies, it means the vessel may 
not deliver the cargo on time and lots of money will be lost. Therefore, the owners of 
ship normally have to pay for it. 
 
On the other hand, the authorities in developed regions enhance the safety standards 
and implement the strict PSC inspection, in order to fight against the substandard 
ships and compel them running out of the regions. However, those ships which are 
still able to sail and create the wealth for the owners can change their sailing routes 
and operate in the developing regions which do not have the high inspection 
requirements. It gives the opportunity for those corrupt PSCOs. 
 
Lack of the unified global PSC organization is the third issue. Various 
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Memorandums of Understandings (MoU) were born with PSC. Each MoU has its 
target selected standards, inspection requirements, controlling regions. Lack of 
cooperation and derecognizing the inspection results of others are parts of the 
restrictive factors for the unified PSC organization. There are also other factors like 
politics, economy, developed level, etc.  
 
All of these have affected the sound development of marine industry. For instance, 
one captain ever complained that the new vessel where he worked received 5 PSC 
inspections during the first 6 months after delivery. Because the new ship has no 
record in the database of PSC, it should be inspected for safety according the PSC 
inspection procedures. The key issue is that each MoU has to check the vessel by 
itself and does not accept the report issued by other MoUs. 
1.2 Objective of research 
Because of the drawbacks existing in the PSC, this thesis is trying to find out a 
solution to the relative issues. As mentioned previously, some problems like the 
excess power without monitoring will pose a series of serious influence, so a 
controlling regime is necessary for PSC. But there is no similar monitoring regime at 
present. The author wants to set up a PSC performance evaluation regime (PSC PER) 
in Asia-Pacific region.  
 
PSC is implemented by each authority and it presents the sovereignty rights of each 
country sometimes. It is not feasible to force each government to do such job as 
forbidding the corruption of PSCOs. Therefore, this thesis will select several key 
factors and establish a model which is a regime that can be operated regularly. The 
model can evaluate the performance of each authority on PSC aspect. Finally, the 
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PSC inspection reports of some authorities with poor performance level will be not 
admitted. The regime can also promote the authorities enhance their management of 
PSC, conscientiously carrying out their duties. 
 
From another point of view, because of pushing the poor PSC management 
authorities out of the games, this model will help to eliminate the regional difference 
between developed and developing areas, and benefit for setting up a unified global 
PSC organization, in order to reduce the insignificantly repetitive inspection and 
accelerate the healthy development of marine industry. 
1.3 Methodology 
Amounts of literature are reviewed beforehand, including IMO documents and 
circulars, international conventions, IMO and relative websites, books and articles 
related with PSC history and development, a series of researches about the 
effectiveness of PSC, some similar performance assessment systems, annual reports 
from relative organizations, and so on. All of these are trying to point out the 
drawbacks of PSC, introducing the relative research methods and preparing for the 
further research.  
 
System engineering method is used to analyze all the key factors related with PSC 
performance. Some formulas are set up used for calculating the duty performance 
level which is one of the subsets of all indicators. Questionnaire survey to experts 
can get the weighting points for each index. Historic inspection data during three 
years are analyzed by statistical approach, in order to form the BGW-list of PSC 
authorities in Tokyo MoU. The random sampling and group controlling ways are 
utilized in the process of verifying the rationality and feasibility of PSC PER. 
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1.4 Structure of dissertation 
The dissertation is comprised of 6 chapters. Chapter Two reviews the history of PSC 
and its development in recent years, especially focusing on the excellent progress in 
Paris and Tokyo MoU. The achievement and drawback of PSC are discussed 
respectively. Several similar researches on performance evaluation are introduced, 
such as flag state evaluation, IMO performance indicates, maritime safety 
administration (MSA) monitoring, etc. Chapter Three mainly analyzes the key 
factors which influences the PSC performance, confirming the calculating method of 
duty performance level and classifying it either. Chapter Four integrates all the 
indicators and gains weighting points for each index from experts’ opinions. And 
then, the completed framework of PSC PER can be formed and a classification 
regulation of authorities will be introduced. Chapter Five discusses and analyzes the 
BGW-list of PSC authorities in Tokyo MoU after introducing historic statistical data. 
Two types of approaches are used to verify the model of PSC PER. Finally, the last 
chapter makes an overall summary and conclusion, including the highlights and 

















Chapter 2 Review of Port State Control and relative performance 
evaluation regimes 
2.1 Introductory remarks 
There are no effective measures used in PSC monitoring directly in the world. For 
one thing, the practitioners in this field are both the performers of rules and the 
policy makers. Managers always pay attention to the ones being managed out, 
ignoring themselves. For another thing, PSC plays a role of third-party supervision, 
which is the last line for controlling the marine safety and pollution prevention. So, 
people alwasys focus on the performance of them by using the data of PSC 
inspection and neglect the monitoring of PSC.  
 
Therefore, since no straightforward experience learned, it is better to make a 
research on the PSC, in order to comprehensively understand for the PSC 
development. Finding out the shortcomings will contribute to propose the solution. 
Some relative performance evaluation regimes are also referred to, which can give 
new ideas for completing the task. 
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2.2 The development of PSC 
2.2.1 The historic changes of PSC 
PSC has a long history carried out in a few of western countries. It only checks the 
certificates and documents on board at first, with little international repercussions. 
However, the grounding vessel with Liberia flag, AMODO CADIZ, changed the 
situation fundamentally. The accident, which caused a spill of 230,000 tonnes crude 
oil, polluting the Brittany coast in France, which shocked the Europe and world 
tremendously. People considered some authorities of flag states had failed to 
perform their duties to ensure their ships to fulfil the requirements of international 
convention. For this reason, in 1980, 13 European countries held a meeting in Paris, 
reaching a agreement on implementing the inspection to the foreign ships which 
wanted to load or discharge cargo in their region. The second conference held in 
January 1982 and issued the Paris Mamorandum of Understanding1 (Paris MoU). It 
entered into force on July 1, 1982 (Ai, 2003). 
 
Because of the achievement of Paris MoU on controlling the substandard ships, IMO 
made a decision to extend this experience. In 1991, the resolution A.682(17)2, 
Regional co-operation in the control of ships and discharges, had been passed in the 
17th IMO Assembly. This resolution asked for establishing similar PSC MoUs all 
around the world to reduce or eliminate the running of substandard ships. 
 
Up to now, nine regional agreements of PSC have been set up. See Table 2.1. The 
United States does not join any MoUs. Its coast guard (USCG) maintains the tenth 
                                                             
1
 The Paris MoU covers the EU, parts of Canada and the Russian Federation. 
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PSC regime independently. Paris MoU, Tokyo Mamorandum of Understanding3 
(Tokyo MoU) and USCG have developed rapidly and owned the largest influence 
level in this field （China Classification Society, 2011, p.1）. All the regional 
cooperation organizations cover most of places in the world.  
 
Table 2.1 The general situation of various MoUs 
Name of MoU Issue Date Region 
No. of 
Members 
Paris MoU Jan. 1982 
Europe and the north 
Atlantic 
27 
Tokyo MoU Dec. 1, 1993 Asia and the Pacific 19 
Vina del Mar 
Agreement 
Nov. 5, 1992 Latin America 13 
Abuja MoU Oct. 22, 1990 West and Central Africa 19 
Caribbean MoU Feb. 9, 1996 Caribbean 12 
Black Sea MoU Apr. 7, 2000 The Black Sea region 6 
Mediterranean MoU Jul. 11, 1997 The Mediterranean 11 
Indian Ocean MoU Jun. 5, 1998 Indian Ocean 18 
Riyadh MoU Jun. 2005 Gulf region 6 
Source: Compiled by author (2015) 
 
2.2.2 The current situation of PSC 
The coverage of inspection is increasing (Fei & Bao, 2006). At beginning, PSC 
inspection normally focused on certificates of crew and main equipments. But, with 
                                                             
3
 The Tokyo MoU covers Asia, Australia, Chile and parts of Canada and the Russian Federation. 
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the growing requirements of marine safety and pollution prevention, the shipping 
companies have to enhance their management and adding the investment. They 
should know the International Ship and Port Facility Security Code (ISPS), 
International Safety Management (ISM), the new Annex VI of the International 
Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships (MARPOL), Maritime 
Labour Convention 2006 (MLC 2006), etc. All of these conventions are involved in 
recent years and used for controling the condition of ships. Therefore, the 
participants now need to learn more and do more, in order to adapt the changes. 
 
The standards of inspection are stricter. With the development of PSC, the officers 
have become more and more professional. For example, the PSCOs from Australia 
maritime safety administration (AMSA) always detained ships by only one 
deficience which is about the work and rest record. Bacause they discovered the 
phenomenon of fake record since the grounding accident of SHEN NENG 1 
happened near the Great Barrier Reef due to the long time working of Chief Officer 
(C/O) (Australian Transport Safety Bureau, 2010). 
 
The regional inspection regime is becoming completely. Paris MoU started to use 
New Inpection Regime (NIR)4 on Jan. 1, 2011. NIR adopted the comprehensive risk 
evaluation method to ensure the risk level of vessels. Meanwhile, introducing the 
company performance is the highlight, which can promote the company to improve 
their level of management. After the running of NIR, the data show each indicator of 
inspection is stable, and decreased than before. See Figure 2.1, 2.2 and 2.3. 
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Figure 2.1 Number of inspecions of Paris MoU 
Source: Paris MoU. (2013). Port State Control annual report 2013. Hague: Author. 
 
 
Figure 2.2 Number of detentions of Paris MoU 





Figure 2.3 Number of deficiencies of Paris MoU 
Source: Paris MoU. (2013). Port State Control annual report 2013. Hague: Author. 
 
Some regional organizations are strengthening co-operation. As the a successful 
regional organization, Tokyo MoU also began to run the NIR5 in Jan. 1, 2014. The 
difference between the two kinds of NIR is mainly on the setting of several 
indicators. For instance, Tokyo MoU insists more than 5 deficiencies in one 
inspection will result in one risk score, while there is no same provision in Paris 
MoU. In addition, the Concentrated Inspection Campaign (CIC), which is annually 
special inspection, held by Paris and Tokyo MoU together with the same theme in 
recent years.  
2.3 Literature review of PSC 
2.3.1 The achievement of PSC 
While the flag state control can not play its role completely, PSC is a kind of 
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supplement for supervising the ships. Therefore, most of the researches are available 
on why and how PSC inspections shall be implemented. In addition, a series of 
researches focus on the statistical analysis on the effectiveness of PSC inspection 
and the relationship with the casualty.  
 
Kasoulides (1993) emphasizes that the flag stae enforcement has weakened due to 
proliferation of open registries. The coastal states have to assert their rights by the 
PSC at the regional level. Clarke (1994) points out port states have no other choice 
except taking active actions to help themselves, because of the ineffectiveness of flag 
states. Kiehne (1996) discusses on whether the sanctions given by PSC authorities 
are available to the foreign ships being checked, ranging from instructions to rectify 
deficiencies. Cuttler (1995) reviews the PSC in the context of ship pollution 
prevention and calls all countries for developing a active framework of PSC to 
prevent incidents and pollution before they happen. 
 
Hare (1997) supplies one of the first researches on the effectiveness of PSC, which 
indicates the regional cooperation organizations like MoUs contribute on 
diminishing the substandard ships. While discussing the iplementation of PSC in UK, 
Odeke (1997) explains that PSC improves maritime safety and pollution prevention 
and slowly eliminates the substandard ships which have the unfair advantage 
associated with operating cheaper. Payoyo (1994) carrys out an assessment of PSC 
regime based on the annual data generated by Paris MoU from 1982 to 1992. The 
result shows PSC has been a conditional success. On the one hand, the substandard 
ships continues to thrive in the shipping market, even though there is the inspection 
regime. On the other hand, it is a significant achievement that the baseline data 
collecting from the substandard ships in the region can increase the effectiveness in 
the enforcement of international standards and more regional co-operation which 
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result in the better utilization of maritiem safety enforcement resources.  
 
During the past decade, people used the inspection data to analyse the effectiveness 
of PSC, especially the relationship between PSC inspection and casualty. Knapp 
(2007, 2008, 2011) presents a series of thesis on this theme from economic 
viewpoint, such as the different effects of various ship safety inspection, the effect of 
PSC inspection on the probability of casualty, the incident cost savings in shipping 
due to inspections. According to his research (See Figure.2.4), for a certain vessel on 
average, the inspection effect is clearly the strongest for very serious casualties. 
Hanninen (2014) pays attention to the same field. He analyses the PSC inspection 
data for finding out the interactions between the various types of deficiencies and the 




Figure 2.4 Effect of inspectioin on probalility of casualty 
Source: Knapp, S., & Franses, P. H.(2007). Econometric analysis of the effect of 
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port state control inspections on the probability of casualty can targeting of 
substandard ships for inspections be improved?. Marine Policy, 31 (4), 
550-563. 
 
Another research also proves the effectiveness of PSC. Some experts focus on the 
reduction in the number of deficiencies after a PSC inspection. They analyze 874 
repeated inspections and find out the reported deficiencies during next inspection 
decreased by 63%, following a previous PSC inspection (Cariou et al., 2008). 
2.3.2 The drawback of PSC 
Even though the PSC develops rapidly and gains series of remarkable achievements 
on the marine safety and pollution prevention during the past decades, many 
disadvantages are also apparent.  
2.3.2.1 Political factors 
PSC is a kind of beneficial supplement to the traditional flag state control inspection 
system. However, it is unavoidable to be a tool of political struggle among countries, 
which is the same like with the IMO instruments. For instance, the NIR, which is 
firstly promoted by Paris MoU in 2011, is for the purpose of stricter inspection to the 
substandard ships. But to some extent, it reflects the political interests of European 
Union (EU). EU is aiming to force its influence on other flag states, recogniazed 
organizations (RO) and ship companies by using the NIR of Paris MoU (Fu & Zhou, 
2011). This is a convert aggression to the maritime rights of other countries.  
 
On the other hand, port states can detain the ships which do not comply with the 
requirements of international convention. But sometimes the detention is not carried 
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out due to politics. For example, the relationship between two countries is tense. 
They detain ships of each other by using PSC instrument, while no detention 
happened between two close countries. A country may conduct a improper detention 
in revenge for its ship normally detained by another country. Sometimes, PSC has 
combined with the political agenda. Singapore once appealed for one PSC 
detention made by China Maritime Safety Administration (MSA), strongly asking 
for changing the action code and cancelling the detention record. Because Singapore 
needed a clear detention record when IMO Voluntary Member State Audit would be 
conducted that year.  
 
Another example can prove this viewpoint either. Before Augest 2004, the detention 
rate of Chinese fleets in Japan was abnormally much higher than other countries or 
regions. China MSA made the utmost efforts to fight for its point of view, 
compelling Japan government to sign the bilateral agreement with China on the 
detention issue. Then, the detention rate of Chinese fleets came back to the rational 




Table 2.2 Comparison of the number of detentions in China fleet between 2001 
and 2004 
Source: Chen, C., & Zeng, X. M. (2006). Existing Problems in PSC and Its 
Development Tendency. Navigation of China, (4), 78-81. 
 
2.3.2.2 Unbalanced regional development 
Though the procedures of port state control6 provide a clear legal basis and unified 
inspection standard, the different backgrounds of politics, economy and culture and 
the different understanding of inspection requirements cause the unbanlanced 
regional development among the countries and regions. For example, Some 
developed countries in Europe and North America have the better performance of 
implementing international conventions and PSC inspection than the developing 
countries and regions (Fei & Bao, 2006). One of the reasons is the inspection 
standard which they implemented is stricter. And then, the old ships are evicted out 
of their regions. But in fact, these substandard vessels are still operated in the market, 
                                                             
6










2001 27 23 19 82.6% 
2002 15 14 13 92.9% 
2003 21 16 14 87.5% 
2004 (January 
to July) 




6 1 16.7% 
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just changing routes to the developing regions where have relaxed inspections. 
Therefore, unbalanced regional development can not help to eliminate the 
substandard ships and improve the progress of the whole shipping industry. 
2.3.2.3 Lack of regional cooperation and data sharing 
Due to the unbanlanced regional development, the inspection results in some regions 
are not admitted by other MoUs, and the data are kept by themselves. Therefore, 
some substandard ships will move to another region after detained in ones, in order 
to escape from the black inspection record. In a sense, the vessels with poor 
condition gain the living room due to this regime. From another viewpoint, the new 
or well managed ships have to face the repeated inspection when they sail from one 
region to another, because of no data sharing and approved inspection results. So, the 
phenomenon of 5 inspections in 6 months for one ship can appear as mentioned 
before. Up to now, The only public database that share the information is Equasis7, 
but the data is not used for risk evaluation or judge the effect of inspections (Knapp 
& Franses, 2008).  
 
There was no regional cooperation until recent years. Paris MoU and Tokyo MoU 
enhance the cooperation, uniting to carry out the CIC and starting to adopt the 
similar NIR early or late. It is a good beginning for the PSC globalization. Regional 
cooperation can promote to use the resources effectively and organize the 
inspections with similar standards, in order to form the global monitoring net for 
protecting safe sailing and preventing environmental pollution.  
                                                             
7
 Equasis is a web-based database which combines data on port state control from three regimes but does not 
allow any statistical analysis of the data. 
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2.3.2.4 Human factors 
Human factor is always a puzzle in marine industry. IMO8 and many experts have 
paid attention to this issue for a long time. However, they mainly focus on human 
factors related to ship operation and marine casualties. However, human factors are 
also a problem existing in PSC.  
 
(1) Capacity 
PSCOs should have professional capacity, enough qualification and adequate 
training (IMO, 2011). They should have the knowledge of ship construction, 
equipments, operation, etc. However, some PSCOs in developing counties are just 
graduated from marine colleges, without seaman experience and complete 
professtional training. So, sometimes they can not find out the serious deficiencies 
during inspection. It is reflected by PSC inspection results. For example, one ship 
gets a clear report at first port, and then dosens of deficiencies appear on the report at 
next port.  
 
(2) Power 
PSCOs have strong power which can determine whether a vessel can be detained or 
not. The action codes used for rectifying the deficiencies can be used by PSCOs in 
freedom. Because sometimes it is really blurry on the differences between action 
code 17 (rectified before departure) and 30 (detention). Therefore, for some 
detainable deficiencies, PSCOs can issue action code 17 without any limitation. In 
this situation, some corruptive PSCOs have the opportunity to ask money or gifts for 
themselves from captains. In some countries, clear report is a bargaining chip in 
                                                             
8





PSCOs’ hands which can be exchanged for bribe. 
 
(3) Emotion 
Attitude determines everything, which is said by a PSCO from Singapore. Actually, 
it is correct to some extent. PSCO is human being firstly, and then he is an officer. 
He can be affected by his emotion. Therefore, the attitude of crew may changes the 
result of inspection. For instance, if the captain is very arrogant, interrupting and 
even refusing the normal inspection without any acceptable reason, PSCOs normally 
will carry out a strict inspection. Conversely, if the ship has only a few minor 
problems and crew cooperate with the PSCOs’ inspection, they may get a clear 
report in the end. 
2.3.2.5 Loopholes of regime 
More power in PSCO’s hand is one leak of the regime. Hard work with poor reward 
is another issue. In Hong Kong and some developed region, PSCOs are the middle 
class, and the salaries are good enough for them to have a decent life. But in some 
developing countries, PSC department is part of government which pays less than 
the company. Therefore, the PSCO may corrupt, and he may do not work hard in the 
limited inspection time. In addition, PSC is a sort of selective check. PSCO normally 
inspects the general condition of ships, while the surveyor from classification society 
has to check all around the vessel and then issue the certificates. So, the inspection 
report is not reliable sometimes. 
 
Even though there are many researches (e.g. Liu & Zhang, 2003; Wang, 2003) on the 
legal liability of improper detention which is caused by PSC, ship owners still lack 
effective approcaches to appeal or review the incorrect PSC inspection results. On 
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the one hand, they are worried about the revenge from PSCOs. On the other hand, 
they may pay more cost and time for the review than the payment they get back 
(Chen & Zeng, 2006). Therefore, up to now, there are only a few cases that ship 
owners sue the PSC authortities for the loss caused by false detention.  
2.4 Literature review of relative performance evaluation regimes 
The purpose of this thesis is to establish a PSC performance evaluation regime in 
order to solve parts of the drawbacks existing in PSC as mentioned above. However, 
author does not find out any researches about this regime. This bar introduces some 
other performance evaluation regimes and similar systems that can be referred to. 
2.4.1 Flag state performance evaluation regime 
Port state is called second line of marine safety, because it is the supplement and 
supervision of flag state. So, the performance of flag fleets can be reflected from the 




Table 2.3 Port state inspections per flag 
 
Source: Tokyo MoU. (2013). Port State Control annual report 2013. Tokyo: Author. 
 
The first flag state performance regime, Black/Grey/White List (BGW-list), was 
introduced by Paris MoU and was adopted by Tokyo MoU later. The BGW-list is 
published every year and compiled using a specific method9. It classifies the 
registries into three groups which are black, grey and white. Black list means flags in 
it perform significantly worse than average and white list show some flags which 
perform significantly better. Table 2.4 shows black list of flag states in Paris MoU. 
In the new recast EU directive4, BGW-list becomes one of risk factors in NIR10 
which is calculated the weighting point using to measure the risk level of ships. 
Because of this, a registry needs to be in the white list. Since its introduction, the 
BGW-list becomes the benchmarking standard for flag performance in shipping 
industry, even if it is only applied in each region.  
 
                                                             
9
 Refer to Port State Control annual report of Paris MoU (2013, pp.58-59) 
10
 Refer to the table 1 of annex 7 in the Paris Memorandum 
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Table 2.4 The black list of flag states in Paris MoU 
 
Source: Paris MoU. (2013). Port State Control annual report 2013. Hague: Author. 
The main duty of flag state is to manage its fleet, so BGW-list regime can be used 
for evaluating its performance. However, this kind of system which only focuses on 
the inspected results of ships can not be applied on PSC directly, because lots of 
other factors need to be considered. 
2.4.2 IMO performance indicators 
In 2010, IMO published its Organization’s Strategic Plan (IMO, 2010) for the 
Organization (for the six-year period 2010-2015), which includes performance 
indicators (PI) and key performance indicators (KPI). These indicators utilize 
statistic data to measure the performance of IMO, with the aim of achieving the 
following (IMO, 2010):  
.1 safe shipping; 
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.2 secure shipping; 
.3 environmentally sound shipping; 
.4 efficient shipping; 
.5 sustainable shipping; 
.6 adoption of the highest practicable standards; 
.7 implementation of instruments; and 
.8 capacity-building. 
 
Table 2.5 shows all the 20 PIs, which are all the main duties of IMO and can 
evaluate the working effectiveness of Organization. This kind of comprehensive 
performance evaluation regime can be referred to when the PSC assessment system 
is set up. Table 2.6 and Table 2.7 indicate the PSC detention rate and PSC 
non-compliance rate which are two of PIs. It means they are the key elements when 
PSC work is evaluated. 
 
Table 2.5 The performance indicators of IMO 
1: Accession to Conventions 11: PSC detention rate 
2: Entry into force 12: PSC non-compliance rate 
3: Implementation and compliance 13: Fraudulent certificates 
4: Lives lost 14: Delivery of technical assistance 
5: Ships lost 15: Sustainability of ITCP 
6: Security failures 16: Cycle time 
7: Piracy and armed robbery 17: IMO's role 
8: Ship-generated water pollution 18: Goal-based standards 
9: Ship-generated air pollution and CO2 
emissions 
19: Work of other UN bodies 
10: Environmental conscience 
20: Efficiency of shipping – 




Source: IMO (2010). 
 
Table 2.6 Performance Indicator: PSC detention rate 
 
Source: IMO (2010). 
 
Table 2.7 Performance Indicator: PSC non-compliance rate 
 
Source: IMO (2010). 
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2.4.3 Safety management performance assessment for MSA 
Some researchers from China and Norway carried out a research on safety 
management performance assessment for MSA (Zhang et al, 2014). They used 
Belief Rule-base (BRB) and generalization of traditional BRB theories (G-BRB) 
methodologies to assess the performance of one MSA in China. These methods 
focus on experts’ opinions using questionnaires to weigh the factors which are 
divided into two groups: safety situation and cost. Figure 2.5 gives their framework 
for MSA performance assessment. 
 
 
Figure 2.5 The framework of research on the MSA performance 
Source: Zhang et al. (2014). 
 
Because of lack of relative historical data, the factors exclude economic loss, 
pollution, etc. Consequently, it is not a completed analysis of MSA performance 
assessment. However, using questionnaires to get experts’ opinion is a good method. 
27 
 
2.4.4 New inspection regime 
As mentioned in this thesis, NIR is a system used for selecting the proper target ships 
which PSCOs need to inspect. This new regime evaluates the ships from many 
aspects, such as type of ship, age of ship, the performance of flag, RO and company, 
deficiencies and detentions, etc. Based on the proper criteria, ships are given the 
weighting points. All of them together calculate the risk level of vessels. Appendix A 
shows the ship risk profile of Tokyo MoU which has a little difference from that of 
Paris MoU. In general, this is an excellent method to assess targets, because of the 
comprehensive, objective and reliable results. 
 
However, there are some shortages like no weighting points for IMO audit now. In 
addition, some corruptive PSCOs can threaten the captains by issuing more 
deficiencies, because one weighting point is calculated when the deficiencies are 5 
and more. It will also reduce the number of detention and deficiencies. 
2.4.5 IMO Member States Audit Scheme 
Even though IMO adopts a series of measures to supervise its Member States on 
implementing IMO instruments, such as formulating more international convention, 
introducing ISM system and flag state performance self-assessment form (SAF), etc. 
(Li & Qiu, 2007), the substandard ships are still running in the shipping industry. 
Therefore, an external audit regime is necessary to be introduced, in order to enhance 
the implementing effectiveness of IMO instruments. 
 
The voluntary IMO Member State Audit Scheme is introduced in the 24th Assembly 
meeting in 2005 by two resolutions: IMO Instruments Implementation Code and the 
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framework and procedures of voluntary IMO Member State Audit Scheme11. In 
2013, IMO’s 28th Assembly meeting adopts new Instruments Implementation Code 
(III Code), paving the way for the scheme to be mandatory by 2016.  
 
This audit regime is intended to provide a comprehensive and objective assessment 
for all the Member States and evaluate their obligations and responsibilities as flag, 
port and coastal States under IMO instruments. It can also offer the necessary 
assistance for them to meet their duties fully and effectively. For example, according 
to the requirements of III Code, a port state should exercise their certain rights and 
obligations under various international instruments. It needs to complete its relative 
national legislation, sending proper inspectors who are authorized, qualified and no 
commercial interest with any aspects. All of these regulations are for the purpose of 
enhancing the implementation of IMO instruments. 
2.5 Concluding remarks 
Chapter 2 is a literature review for the final target of the thesis. The history and 
development of PSC can help us understand the current situation. Meanwhile, with 
the evolution of PSC for decades, it really gains the achievements to some extent, 
which plays an important role in attacking the substandard ships with high 
effectiveness. However, some drawbacks, like political and human factors, 
unbalanced regional development, lacking regional cooperation, etc., have appeared 
and showed the challenges either which should receive attention and overcome by 
practitioners.  
 
It also reveals the purpose of setting up a PSC performance evaluation regime, which 
                                                             
11
 Referring to A.973(24) and A.974(24) 
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aims to solve parts of shortages. Because of no same regime running in the maritime 
field, some relative performance assessment systems are really valuable to be studied 
and used for reference. Author lists the evaluating regimes for IMO, MSA, IMO 
Member States, flag states and vessels. According to all of them, a new system for 
assessing the PSC is forming, which should be comprehensive, objective and reliable, 
with the evaluating factors from all the aspects, especially the statistics and analysis 









Chapter 3 Analysis of key factors in the PSC performance 
evaluation regime 
3.1 Introductory remarks 
Due to the mature regional organizations (MoUs), it is hard to establish a worldwide 
PSC performance evaluation regime immediately. However, it is feasible to set up 
this system in one region like Asia-Pacific area where exists Tokyo MoU. In this vast 
region, Member States have different cultures, histories, politics and economic levels, 
so the PSC development is also unbalanced. It means the assessing factors of PSC 
should be considered comprehensively. This Chapter will use the system engineering 
method to classify all the possible elements which may affect the PSC performance. 
And then, defining the key factors and confirming relationship among them. Some 
statistical method will be adopted.  
 
Generally, it is necessary to assess one target on both internal and external sides. For 
one PSC authority, the internal indicator is the self-condition like the management, 
human resources, and so on; the external indicator is normally the evaluation index 
from outside. As mentioned in the previous chapter, some PSC inspection data are 
used for measuring the work of IMO. And the main duty of PSC is to inspect the 
vessel, in order to ensure the safety and prevent pollution. Therefore, the duty 
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performance of PSC should be considered. To sum up, three subsets belong to the 
PSC PER according to author’s opinion. See Figure. 3.1. 
 
 
Figure. 3.1 Three factor subsets of PSC PER 
Source: Compiled by Author. (2015). 
3.2 Internal Indicator 
The purpose of this subset is to assess the internal management level of one PSC 
authority; so many factors have to be considered. Some of them are listed as follows: 
 
1. Coverage. In one country, PSC authority normally has a headquarters and several 
regional offices located at ports. Therefore, whether PSC inspection can cover all the 
regions in this country is the first matter to be concerned.  
2. Legislation. Some national laws should support and authorize to carry out the PSC 
inspection on foreign ships visiting its ports.  
3. Quality system. Whether there is a quality system working in PSC department or 
not? If there is, some documents have to be checked for assessing the running 
condition of the system. 
4. Procedures. The PSC inspection procedures of IMO should be implemented.  
5. Human resources. The recruitment criteria and qualifications for PSCOs engaged 
in port state need to be evaluated.  
6. Data. The inspection data from annual inspection report of MoU can show the 
PSC PER 
Internal Indicator Duty performance level External assessment 
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working performance of one PSC authority. It can also give the comparison with 
other countries in the same region.  
7. Self evaluation. The PSC authority should carry out the self assessment annually 
and continual improvement. 
 
All above are parts of the internal factors which can be used for assessing the 
performance of PSC authorities. Compared with the items in IMO Member States 
Audit, it can find that most of them are the same. Therefore, based on the idea of 
using the current resources and data completely, IMO audit result can take the place 
of the factors evaluating the internal management level of PSC authorities. In 
another word, the performance of internal indicator in the thesis depends on whether 
the country has passed the IMO audit. 
3.3 Duty performance level 
The duty performance level can not judge the PSC inspection level completely, but it 
can weigh whether the PSCOs try their best to finish the duties and how hard they do. 
A quantitative model will be set up in this bar for measuring the duty performance 
level of PSC authorities. As mentioned earlier, PSC detention rate and 
non-compliance rate (inspections with deficiencies rate) are two key indicators about 
PSC in IMO’s Strategic Plan. In addition, the number of deficiencies in one 
inspection are important either, not only it is a factor using for determining the ship 
risk level in NIR, but also the limitation for PSCOs. For example, a country can 
increase its non-compliance rate easily by issuing the reports with only one or two 
simple deficiencies. But if the number of deficiencies becomes one of the indicators, 
the quality of inspections can be ensured. Therefore, it can calculate the duty 





Figure 3.2 The system of duty performance level 
Source: Compiled by Author. (2015). 
3.3.1 Definition 
In order to quantitatively evaluate the duty performance of PSC, this thesis 
introduces the ship detention rate, ship deficiency rate, the number of deficiencies in 
one inspection, regional detention rate, regional deficiency rate, regional number of 
deficiencies in one inspection, PSC detention level, PSC deficiency level, PSC 
deficiency level in one inspection and PSC duty performance level. In addition, 
because of few deficiencies and detention found in follow-up inspection, the total 
number of inspection is expressed by the number of initial inspections. All of them 
are defined as follows:  
 
1. Ship detention rate A
det
F  means dividing the numbers of detention in one PSC 
authority by its number of initial inspections in a fixed period time (36 months). 
2. Ship deficiency rate A
def
F  means dividing the number of inspections with 
deficiencies in one PSC authority by its number of initial inspections in a fixed 
period time (36 months). 
3. Numbers of deficiencies in one inspection A
Idef
F means dividing all the 
deficiencies found by one PSC authority by its number of initial inspections in a 
Duty performance level 
Detention rate Non-compliance rate 




fixed period time (36 months). 
4. Regional detention rate 
det
RF means dividing all the numbers of detention in the 
region by all the numbers of initial inspections in a fixed period time (36 months). 
5. Regional deficiency rate R
def
F means dividing all the number of inspections with 
deficiencies in the region by all the numbers of initial inspections in a fixed period 
time (36 months). 
6. Regional number of deficiencies in one inspection R
Idef
F means dividing all the 
deficiencies inspected in the region by all the number of initial inspections in a fixed 
period time (36 months). 
7. PSC detention level A
det
L means dividing detention rate of one PSC authority by 
regional detention rate in a period time. 
8. PSC deficiency level A
def
L means dividing deficiencies rate of one PSC authority 
by regional deficiencies rate in a period time. 
9. PSC deficiency level in one inspection A
Idef
L means dividing one PSC authority’s 
numbers of deficiencies in one inspection by the regional ones in a period time. 
10. PSC duty performance level AL  means the sum of PSC detention level, PSC 
deficiencies level and PSC deficiency level in one inspection. 
3.3.2 Calculating method 
There are 19 members in Tokyo MoU and all the related data can be got from annual 
reports of Tokyo MoU. However, Marshall Islands joined Tokyo MoU in recent 
years and entered the data into Asia-Pacific Computerized Information System 
(APCIS) since 2013. Therefore, author only calculates the data of 18 countries 





Table 3.1 The calculating model of port state inspections carried out by 



































C1 a1 b1 e1 f1       
C2 a2 b2 e2 f2       
C3 a3 b3 e3 f3       
… … … … … … … … … … … … … … … 




























Source: Compiled by Author. (2015). 
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L                                        (3.10) 
 
Actually, formula 3.1 to 3.3 present the inspection situation of each authority from 
four aspects, deficiency, detention and deficiency number in one inspection and 
formula 3.4 to 3.6 show the regional average level. Formula 3.7 to 3.9 are the 
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comparison between one authority and regional average level.  
 
Obviously, when inspection level of one authority equals the regional level, the 













L , AL =3. It means the average duty 
performance level over the region is 3. 
 
While the duty performance level of one authority is higher then the regional average, 
it illustrates the PSCOs in it work hard and have better duty performance. 
Conversely, it needs to discuss. Because if only the authorities performing higher 
than the average are accepted, it means others are encouraged to issue more 
deficiencies and detain more ships, which is out of the basic objective of PSC. 
Therefore, author proposes to classify the results, referring to the BWG-list which 
shows the white, grey and black list of flag states’ performance. In ideal condition, 
the performance level of one authority is a constant 3. In this case, all the results 
which are over 2 can be accepted. And then, the outcomes between 1 and 2 means 
these authorities have to enhance their effort level and perform their duties better. 
Finally, for those under 1, they should be warned and disposed combining with other 
factors. The classification is showed in Figure 3.3. 
 
Figure 3.3 The classification of duty performance level 
Source: Compiled by Author. (2015). 
0 1 2 3 
Warning Encouraged Accepted 
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3.4 External assessment 
Both the internal indicators and the duty performance level are the judging methods 
basing on the actual working situation of PSC authorities themselves. However, 
some voices from outside can supervise the internal running and promote the system 
to improve. For instance, the customer satisfaction is one of the most important 
reasons for the success of company Apple Inc, although it has the excellent products. 
Therefore, external assessment is essential for PSC PER. 
 
Three factors can be introduced: result of questionnaire survey, successful appeal 
rate, responsible casualty rate (See Figure 3.4). Questionnaire survey is to send the 
questionnaire to ship owners, companies, crew, etc., asking the feedback of PSC 
inspection. For example, whether the PSCOs demand for money, cigarettes, or other 
reward? Do the procedures of PSC inspection follow the IMO documents? Are the 
PSC reports issued and left on board after the inspection? All similar questions can 
be asked, and the answers will be collected. The statistic data are a kind of 
viewpoints to show the PSC performance. 
 
 
Figure 3.4 System of external assessment 
Source: Compiled by Author. (2015). 
 
Appeal is the second aspect. Appeal is an approach for ship owners and management 
External assessment 





companies to explain and argue for the deficiencies and detentions on which they 
have different opinions. However, according to the appeal procedures in Tokyo 
MoU12, this process is firstly handled by the authorities which issue the PSC 
inspection reports. Therefore, ship owners or crew always conduct this procedure by 
the way of on-site or email discussion. Few real legal actions are taken by them, due 
to worry of revenge. At present, this appeal procedure has been implemented strictly 
in some countries, even though it is not fair enough. In 2012, 30 appeals accepted by 
AMSA and none of them succeeded. One detention lawsuit finished in the same year, 
and AMSA won (Yang & Yang, 2014). In China, the appeal procedures were 
uniformly processed by China PSC sub-committee where located at Tianjin MSA 
since 2013. 15 appeal cases were finished and the results were accepted by both 
inspectors and ship owners and adopted by Tokyo MoU secretariat13 
 
The third point of view is responsible casualty rate. Although there are many 
researches on the relationship between PSC inspection and casualty, it is almost not 
an overall statistics on the casualties caused by the negligence of PSC inspection. In 
China, an investigation will be carried out after one accident happened on whether 
the flag state control officers (FSCO) missing the serious deficiencies which results 
the tragedy. However, there are also no comprehensive official statistics about this. 
In fact, the purpose of PSC is to prevent the incidents and pollution. If the PSCOs do 
not perform their duties seriously, it is no meaning of their existence.  
 
Overall, all these three factors can reflect the PSC performance from the view of a 
third party. But some puzzles are in front of the roads. First of all, there are no 
                                                             
12




 Data came from unpublished internal documents of Tianjin MSA. 
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comprehensive official statistic data for using. Secondly, the authenticity of the data 
can not be ensured if they are from the authorities themselves. Thirdly, it is lack of a 
feasible and reasonable procedure. 
 
Therefore, it is necessary to set up a special agency to finish this external assessment 
as a third party. The employees in it can send the questionnaires, following the data, 
verifying the truth of the data, accepting and judging the appeal cases, etc. Finally, 
after collecting all the effective data of these three factors, a system of external 
assessment can be established. The method of confirming duty performance can be 
used here. The data of each authority is utilized for the comparison with the average 
level and measure their performance from external viewpoint.  
3.5 Concluding remarks 
This chapter introduces the factor subsets of PSC PER, which are internal indicators, 
duty performance level and external assessment. All the relative indexes are 
analyzed and set up the subsystems by using system engineering method. Firstly, 
several internal indicators are explained and discussed, finding out the common 
points with IMO Member State Audit. Final conclusion is IMO audit results can be 
instead of the internal indicators in general. Secondly, a model is established for 
judging the duty performance of PSC authorities after analyzing the relative factors 
basing on the researches of other similar regimes. Three grades are set up to classify 
the different duty performance level. Finally, author discusses the external 
assessment, analyzing the three key elements, introducing the difficulties existing in 
the current system and proposing a proper solution. All of these are prepared for the 








Chapter 4 Setting up the PSC performance evaluation regime 
4.1 Introductory remarks 
Basing on the relative literature review and analysis of all the key factors, this 
chapter focuses on integrating previous researches and establishing the PSC PER. 
Three subsets of indicators related with PSC performance will be combined together, 
composing the assessing system of PSC performance. And then, experts’ suggestion 
will be collected, which are used for endowing the weighting points to each 
evaluating index. When the whole framework of PSC PER is constructed, some 
introductions are needed to explain the scoring mechanism and application. Finally，
a BGW-list for measuring PSC performance can be formed. 
4.2 Factors integration 
Three subsets of indicators are introduced into the system in the preceding chapter, 
the rudiment of the PSC PER has been formed after integrating all the factors. Table 
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Source: Compiled by Author. (2015). 
4.3 The distribution of weighting points 
15 experts’ opinions are collected by questionnaires. 7 of them are the PSCOs 
engaging in PSC inspection for more than 5 years, while 3 ones serving in shipping 
companies as managers, 3 captains and 1 professor from a maritime university. 
Author asks them for allotting the weighting points to each factor in the PSC PER. 





Figure 4.1 Weighting points of three factor subsets 
 
Source: Compiled by Author. (2015). 
 
Figure 4.2 Weighting points for three classifications of duty performance level 
 
Source: Compiled by Author. (2015). 
 
Figure 4.3 Weighting points for indexes of external assessment 
 
Source: Compiled by Author. (2015). 
 
All the experts have the same recommendations, using the results of IMO Member 
States Audit Scheme to replace the factors of internal indicator. And most of them 
(13 experts) give 2 weighting points on this index. The divergence appears in the 
allocation of the weighting points between duty performance level and external 
assessment. PSCOs insist to allot more scores on the former, while the managers of 
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2 5 3 
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balanced results are concluded as above.  
 
In the subset of duty performance, the authorities which receive the accepted 
evaluation can gain the full scores, whereas 2.5 for the encouraged group. Those 
which play poor duty performance have to be observed for one year and allotted zero 
score during this time. In the subset of external assessment, if the authorities have 
excellent performance on each factor, they can get the points. Otherwise, nothing 
will be given.  
4.4 PSC PER 
4.4.1 The framework of PSC PER 
Combining the key elements and weighting points, the framework of PSC PER can 
be got as Table 4.2. However, as mentioned previously, a special agency as a third 
party is needed to collect data and carry out the external assessment, which does not 
exist at present. Therefore, the score of this category is supposed as 2. Then the 




Table 4.2 The framework of PSC PER 
Authority  
Subsets Key factors Weighting Score 





level Accepted 5 
 
Questionnaire survey 1  
Successful appeal rate 1  
External 
assessment 
Responsible casualty rate 1  
Totally score  
Source: Compiled by Author. (2015). 
 
Table 4.3 The temporary model of PSC PER 
Authority  
Subsets Key factors Weighting Score 





level Accepted 5 
 
Questionnaire survey 1 
Successful appeal rate 1 
External 
assessment 
Responsible casualty rate 1 
2 
Totally score  
Source: Compiled by Author. (2015). 
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4.4.2 The classification of PSC performances 
Like the BGW-list for measuring flag state performances and three categories used in 
the duty performance, it is better to classify the authorities, which can distinguish 
between the different PSC performances easily. The BGW-list for PSC performance 
shows in Figure 4.4. The authorities with the score 7 and more can be listed in white 
list, which means better performance, while score 5 to 7 in the grey group needed 
more efforts. The ones performing under the score 5 are in black list, which have to 
be observed for a period of time (one year). After that, if the performance has still 
not improved yet, the inspection reports issued by them should not be admitted any 
more and it is better to kick them out of the family of PSC.  
 
 
Figure 4.4 The classification of PSC performance 
Source: Compiled by Author. (2015). 
 
According to this classification, all the three factor subsets are important. For the 
authorities getting zero weighting point on duty performance, they are in black list 
unless all 5 other marks obtained. However, it is almost impossible due to low 
deficiency and detention rate resulting high casualty rate. For the ones with 2.5 
scores on duty performance, they have to pay more attention to other two categories 
and enhance their inspections. Even though some ones grab all the 7 weighting 
points on IMO audit and duty performance, they can not stay in white list without 
0 10 5 7 
Black Grey White 
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annoyance. The third Party will release the data of external assessment to the public. 
If they exchange more deficiencies and detention reports without any limitation for 
high scores of duty performance, the endless appeals will beat them down.  
4.5 Concluding remarks 
The whole chapter is for the purpose of setting up the PSC performance evaluation 
regime. Following the preceding researches, all the key factors are integrated, and 
combined with the weighting points which are the summarized results of experts’ 
suggestions. The framework of PSC PER is one of the pivotal achievements in this 
thesis. However, it has to utilize the temporary one in the following discussion, 
because of lack of some important data. To classify the PSC performance of different 
authorities is the fatal solution for cleaning the PSC team. Then next chapter will 




















Chapter 5 Discussion and verification of the PSC PER 
5.1 Introductory remarks 
Even though the framework has been established according to the theory research 
and analysis, it still can not be used for judging the PSC performance directly. Data 
verification is an essential procedure, which can support the achievement coming 
into practice. This Chapter will introduce the relative statistic data from annual 
reports of Tokyo MoU and other approaches to discuss the performance of each 
authority. Some comparison data will be used to verify performance results. Finally, 
the conclusion of whether the feasibility of the model of PSC PER can be got. 
5.2 Data introduction and statistics 
5.2.1 Information of internal indicators 
As mentioned before, the internal indicators are replaced by results of IMO Member 
State Audit. However, the data of whether the 18 authorities of Tokyo MoU passing 
the audit can not be collected, because it is not the released information, just like 
what is said in frequent asked questions of Paris MoU website. 
 
This information is distributed by an internal IMO Circular which is not publicly 
available. Individual States may decide to make the information publicly available, 
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but there is no requirement to do so. States are invited to inform the Paris MoU 
Secretariat as soon as an audit has been concluded. However, according to 
paragraph 12 in Annex 7 of the amended memorandum, the Paris MoU Secretariat 
will maintain on the Paris MoU public website an up-to-date list of flag States which 
meet the flag criteria for a low risk ship. Accordingly flag States figuring on this list 
will all have been through the voluntary IMO Audit and will be a white listed flag.  
----Paris MoU14 
 
Author searches the internal documents of IMO through the database of IMO 
Documents (IMODOCS), finding nothing except the latest progress report on the 
implementation of the audit scheme (IMO, 2015) which introduces the countries 
planning to audit in 2016 and 2017. But other progress reports never show the name 
of countries passing the audit, only the total numbers. It is conjectured the 
information is protected due to the voluntary policy, until the audit scheme becoming 
mandatory by January 1, 2016.  
 
Therefore, it has to determine the results of audit by other approaches. According to 
the explanation of Paris MoU, 6 countries in Tokyo MoU are confirmed passing the 
audit by checking the low risk ship list. But as they said, some countries are not in 
the list even though they pass the audit, because of other drawbacks. Two countries, 
Papua New Guinea and Vanuatu, do not get through the audit, because they are on 
the auditing plan in the next two years. For others, the results are unknown on 
account of lack of official documents supporting and assumed not passing the audit. 
                                                             
14 This is the answer for the question “Will it be possible to see on the public website of the Paris MoU a list of 
States which have undergone the Voluntary IMO Member State Audit Scheme (VIMSAS)?”, which is retrieved 





The summarized information and weighting points are as follow: 
 
Table 5.1 The results of IMO Member State Audit 
Authority IMO audit Weighting points 
Australia Unknown 0 
Canada Unknown 0 
Chile Unknown 0 
China Pass 2 
Fiji Unknown 0 
Hong Kong, China Pass 2 
Indonesia Unknown 0 
Japan Pass 2 
Republic of Korea Pass 2 
Malaysia Unknown 0 
New Zealand Unknown 0 
Papua New Guinea Not pass 0 
Philippines Unknown 0 
Russian Federation Pass 2 
Singapore Pass 2 
Thailand Unknown 0 
Vanuatu Not pass 0 
Viet Nam Unknown 0 
Source: Compiled by Author basing on relative official information. (2015). 
5.2.2 Data of duty performance level 
Duty performance level as defined by author mainly depends on the PSC inspection 
results. Basing on the inspection data of authorities in the annual reports of Tokyo 
MoU between 2011 and 2013, author integrates and calculates the data following the 
method in Chapter 3, getting the statistic data showed in Table 5.2 and Table 5.3. 
And then, 3 groups are classified, which indicates the different duty performances 
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clearly (See Table 5.4). They can gain the weighting points 5, 2.5, 0 separately.  
 
































Australia 9523 5354 24372 718 0.562218 0.075396 2.559278 
Canada
15
 1228 717 2508 24 0.583876 0.019544 2.042345 
Chile 2664 1150 3006 61 0.431682 0.022898 1.128378 
China 24220 20527 140432 2006 0.847523 0.082824 5.798183 
Fiji 88 9 16 0 0.102273 0 0.181818 
Hong Kong, China 2229 1657 7673 104 0.743383 0.046658 3.442351 
Indonesia 7607 2104 9778 180 0.276587 0.023662 1.285395 
Japan 15634 10046 50741 659 0.642574 0.042152 3.245555 
Republic of Korea 6634 4722 21708 374 0.711788 0.056376 3.272234 
Malaysia 2638 1302 5124 53 0.493556 0.020091 1.942381 
New Zealand 1284 699 2414 35 0.544393 0.027259 1.880062 
Papua New Guinea 278 99 377 8 0.356115 0.028777 1.356115 
Philippines 5944 1379 5100 11 0.231999 0.001851 0.858008 
Russian Federation
15
 3189 2352 12818 69 0.737535 0.021637 4.019442 
Singapore 2301 1919 9239 95 0.833985 0.041286 4.015211 
Thailand 1288 322 833 10 0.25 0.007764 0.646739 
Vanuatu 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Viet Nam 3821 2332 10459 95 0.610311 0.024863 2.737242 
Total 90573 56690 306598 4502 0.6259 0.04971 3.38509 
Source: Compiled by Author basing on the data from annual reports of Tokyo MoU. 
(2011, 2012 and 2013). 
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Australia 1.516854 0.898249 0.756044 3.171147 
Canada 0.393193 0.932853 0.603335 1.929381 
Chile 0.460669 0.689693 0.333338 1.4837 
China 1.666288 1.354078 1.712858 4.733224 
Fiji 0 0.1634 0.053711 0.217111 
Hong Kong, China 0.938678 1.187694 1.016915 3.143287 
Indonesia 0.47605 0.441901 0.379722 1.297673 
Japan 0.848025 1.026633 0.958779 2.833437 
Republic of Korea 1.134199 1.137216 0.96666 3.238075 
Malaysia 0.404198 0.788549 0.573804 1.766551 
New Zealand 0.548399 0.86977 0.555395 1.973563 
Papua New Guinea 0.578947 0.568961 0.400614 1.548522 
Philippines 0.037231 0.370662 0.253467 0.66136 
Russian Federation 0.435299 1.178352 1.187395 2.801046 
Singapore 0.830616 1.332449 1.186145 3.34921 
Thailand 0.156199 0.399422 0.191055 0.746676 
Vanuatu 0 0 0 0 
Viet Nam 0.500196 0.975088 0.808616 2.2839 
Source: Calculated by Author basing on the data from annual reports of Tokyo MoU 




Table 5.4 The classification of authorities’ duty performance in Tokyo MoU 
during 3 years 
















1.97356 Thailand 0.74668 
Singapore 3.34921 Canada 1.92938 Philippines 0.66136 
Republic of 
Korea 




1.54852 Vanuatu 0 
Hong Kong, 
China 
3.14329 Chile 1.4837   
Japan 2.83344 Indonesia 1.29767   
Russian 
Federation 
2.80105     
Viet Nam 2.2839     
Source: Compiled by Author basing on the data from annual reports of Tokyo MoU 
(2011, 2012 and 2013). 
 
5.3 Discussion and analysis of the outcome of PSC PER 
Basing on method and definition in the preceding chapter, combining with the actual 
data and assumption, the scores of the authorities in Tokyo MoU can be seen in 
Table 5.5. All the authorities are classified as white and black list. However, there are 
no members in the grey list due to the lack of essential information and data. It is 
also the reason for lots of authorities listed in black list. On the basis of this situation, 
it is better to set an interim period of 3 years before the regime really running. On the 
one hand, there is a process for establishing a third Party and collecting relative data. 
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On the other hand, IMO audit schedule is fixed and Member States have to be 
audited one by one, which needs time. 
 










China 2 5 2 9 
Singapore 2 5 2 9 
Republic of Korea 2 5 2 9 
Hong Kong, China 2 5 2 9 
Japan 2 5 2 9 
Russian Federation 2 5 2 9 
Australia 0 5 2 7 
Viet Nam 0 5 2 7 
New Zealand 0 2.5 2 4.5 
Canada 0 2.5 2 4.5 
Malaysia 0 2.5 2 4.5 
Papua New Guinea 0 2.5 2 4.5 
Chile 0 2.5 2 4.5 
Indonesia 0 2.5 2 4.5 
Thailand 0 0 2 2 
Philippines 0 0 2 2 
Fiji 0 0 2 2 
Vanuatu 0 0 2 2 
Source: Compiled by Author. (2015). 
 
Overviews the outcome above, most of the authorities in white list supported by the 
statistic data have an positive evaluation in shipping industry for their excellent PSC 
performance. However, even though listed in white list at present, some of them still 
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need enhance their management and inspection level. Otherwise, they will be out of 
the team immediately after the collection of the completed data.  
 
For those scored 4.5, some of them are suffering the loss of data. And some ones like 
Canada and New Zealand have to inspect the vessels with better condition. This is 
also a drawback in Tokyo MoU and PSC PER. Because of large range (Asia-Pacific 
region) and unbalanced PSC performance level, some authorities which inspect good 
condition vessels have to lose marks, while others which have lots of substandard 
ships to inspect performing much better than the average and getting high scores in 
duty performance. However, as a comprehensive regime, they can not be in the black 
list for long time, if the data is collected. Others which also gain 4.5 like Malaysia 
and Indonesia need work harder. 
 
The authorities with only 2 marks have to be alert and face the status seriously. 
Vanuatu performing weakly can be explained by few ships arriving. But others need 
to find out the real causes and overcome them, if they still want to stay in the 
organization of PSC. 
5.4 Verification on the results of PSC PER 
Because of the unbalanced regional development of PSC and the different inspection 
standards, it is unfair to compare the PSC inspection data among MoUs. For 
example, some substandard ships can be operated in the areas of Tokyo MoU, while 
never moved to regions of Paris MoU. Therefore, when the outcome of PSC PER in 
Tokyo MoU is verified, selecting the data of similar vessel condition is a proper way. 
Two approaches are used in this bar, including the inspection data of classification 
society and sample comparison.  
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5.4.1 Verification by statistic data of ClassNK 
Nippon Kaiji Kyokai (ClassNK or NK) is a ship classification society, which is 
engaged in ship-related activities and services aiming at promoting the protection of 
human life and property at sea and marine environment. NK has the largest 
registered fleet in the world, which owns 8,915 ships over 234.6 million gross 
tonnages (GT) under class by the end of February, 2015. See Figure 5.1. The PSC 
inspected performance of NK fleet is medium (Nippon Kaiji Kyokai, 2014, p.54), 
comparing with other classification societies. In addition, lots of ships inspected and 
the extensive distribution of detained vessels from the aspects of ship size, age, type 
((Nippon Kaiji Kyokai, 2014, pp.12-14) mean the reliable and fair data. Therefore, 
the inspection data of NK can reflect the PSC performance in a sense.  
 
Figure 5.1 Detailed statistics on the NK’s registered fleet 
 
Source: Nippon Kaiji Kyokai. (2015). 
 
Because many ships under NK class are sailing in the Asia-Pacific region, it is 
approximately two thirds of the total number of ships detained by the authorities in 
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Tokyo MoU. Table 5.6 shows the detention of NK fleet by port sate around the world 
between 2011 and 2013. Some authorities like China, Australia, Japan, Republic of 
Korea, etc, perform as well as the results of PSC PER. Some other ones like 
Philippines and Thailand play a negligible role, even though the former has 
sixth-largest inspection numbers in the region every year (See Table 5.7). That is 
why they are in the black list of PSC PER.  
 
Table 5.6 Detentions by port state (NK) 
 
Source: Nippon Kaiji Kyokai. (2014).  
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Table 5.7 Port state inspections carried out by port authorities of Tokyo MoU 
(NK) 
 
Source: Nippon Kaiji Kyokai. (2014). 
5.4.2 Verification by statistic data of two sample groups 
Some may argue that the authorities like Philippines has high inspection standard 
before, which is the same as the ones in Paris MoU. So the poor condition vessels 
never call their ports. For this reason, the randomized sampling and grouping control 
methods are used. First of all, the first initial inspection record of Philippines found 
in the PSC database of Tokyo MoU16 every month from 2011 to 2013 are extracted, 
including the information of ship construction time, deficiency and detention, and 
ignoring ship information like name, IMO number and call sign. And then, two 
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inspection records of each ship which are front and rear the one of Philippines are 
selected with the same inspection information and the authorities which carry out the 
inspection. Thirdly, the inspection data of PSC in China are chosen as a controlling 
group. The procedures above are repeated and the information can be summarized. 
In addition, if the ship is inspected by the same authorities (Philippines or China) in 
these three inspections, its data will be considered ineffectively and wiped out of the 
groups. Finally, two controlling groups are shown in Appendix B and Appendix C. 
The samples of Philippines are defined as group A, while group B for the ones of 
China  
 
Analyzing the data of each group, the conclusion is as follows: 
1. Similar distribution of ship age in two groups means no much difference of ship 
condition. The PSCOs from two countries are in the same starting line. 
2. Group A issues 23 clear reports in the total 26 effective samples of ship, while 
group B having only 3 times in the total 20 ones.  
3. 11 ships receive the reports without any deficiency in group A, when the 
deficiencies appear on both the reports before and after. Only one of these situations 
is found in group B.  
4. The ship of No.10 in group A constructed in 1999 receives clear report twice after 
8 deficiencies issued by Russian Federation. It happens again for the ship of No.21 
in group A. Australia detained this ship with 7 deficiencies, and then two reports 
issued by Philippines with zero deficiencies. As it shows, the keel laid time of the 
vessel was 1984. 
5. The sample of No.16 in group B reflects the same decisions on striking the 
substandard ships and similar inspection standards. China detained the vessel at first 




In the mass, group B shows little difference. But for group A, the large difference 
between Philippines and other authorities can not be explained except poor working 
attitude and lack of a sense of responsibility. There may be other problems existing 
either, like the corruptions which are always complained by crew. 
5.5 Suggestions for authorities in black list 
The PSC PER can be proved as a rational and feasible method for measuring the 
performance of PSC, according to the discussion and verification in this chapter. 
Therefore, the authorities in the black list have not any excuses, but to improve their 
working performance as soon as possible. Firstly, their governments have to enhance 
the management of PSC departments, offering a proper payment and stopping the 
phenomenon of corruption, regulating the inspection procedures and seriously 
dealing with complaints from ship owners and crew. Secondly, the PSCOs need to 
take a correct attitude towards work and enhance the operational capability. When 
the agency as a third party is established, it shall copy with the complaints and 
supervise PSC performance of authorities in black list. 
5.6 Concluding remarks 
Basing on the model of PSC PER, this Chapter introduces the historical data, getting 
the statistical results and classifying the PSC performance of authorities in Tokyo 
MoU. And then, two approaches are used for verifying the model. The data from NK 
class proves the distribution of BGW-list of PSC performance is rational and feasible. 
The same conclusion is obtained by analyzing the statistical data, using the methods 
of randomized sampling and grouping control. Finally, several suggestions are given 
to the authorities in the black list, in order to support them to improve their PSC 







Chapter 6 Conclusions 
This thesis mainly focuses on the PSC performance evaluation due to a series of 
actual puzzles existing in the current PSC system such as unbalanced regional 
development, different inspection standards, the great power without proper 
limitation, repeated inspections among different MoUs and corruptions, etc. The 
PSC PER is a solution which the author is trying to find out for solving these issues.  
 
One of the highlights in this research is to set up a PSC PER which is not a part of 
PSC regime as present. Overview of the history and current situation, PSC has 
played an important role as the second line, getting lots of achievements on marine 
safety and environmental protection. However, there is not a comprehensive and 
feasible regime using for supervising the PSC, even though many drawbacks existed 
as mentioned in Chapter 2. Besides the PSC, there are many regimes adopted for 
measuring the performance of relative organizations, such as BGW-list for flag state 
performance, IMO performance indicators, NIR for selecting proper ships to be 
inspected, the researches on MSA performance and IMO Member States Audit 
Scheme. 
 
Therefore, author wants to establish the PSC PER, in order to regular the chaotic       
phenomena of PSC and clear the team. Referring to the relative research methods of 
performance evaluation, three factor subsets are constructed by system engineering 
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approach, which are internal indicators, duty performance level and external 
assessment. Each index under three groups is analyzed and concluded. Finally, the 
conclusion is that the internal indicators can be replaced by the results of IMO 
Member State Audit. The external assessment should be measured through 
questionnaire survey, successful appeal rate and responsible casualty rate. The model 
of duty performance level is another highlight in the thesis. After three key judging 
elements confirmed, author sets up a model with the calculating method and 
classification system. 
 
Following the integration of the subsets, experts are invited to give the weighting 
points for indicators. And then, the whole framework of PSC PER is established. The 
classification is used once more, in order to distinguish between the different PSC 
performances. During the process of verification, historic data are introduced into the 
model of PSC PER. And then, BGW-list of PSC performance in Tokyo MoU is 
formed. According to the analysis and discussion, two verifying approaches show 
the framework of PSC PER is reliable and feasible. Particularly, the sampling 
comparison illustrates the huge performance difference of PSC authorities between 
white list and black list. Some possible reasons are deduced and several suggestions 
are given. 
 
In conclusion, this thesis only researches the PSC performance of Tokyo MoU due to 
data difference caused by unbalanced regional development. However, the PSC PER 
can be proved to play the role of PSC supervision effectively. This regime can 
estimate the PSC performance as a whole, and encourage the authorities to work 
harder. Some ones without implementing their responsibilities will be picked and 
warned. Otherwise, they should be evicted out of the PSC organization. In addition, 
the results of this research can be a preparation for PSC globalization which will be 
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the trend in future.  
 
However, there is still a little regret. Because of the lack of effective information and 
data, the results of PSC PER are not completed, even though it has a comprehensive 
framework. In fact, PSC PER is an ideal model, which has a long way to come into 
force unless IMO can promote it. It is a rough road with political struggles between 
the authorities with poor performance and the ones supporting this regime. Moreover, 
the evaluating system can be detailed and the scoring mechanism may be improved. 
All of them are the research to be done in future. 
 
In future, close regional cooperation shall be the trend in short-term. Tokyo MoU 
and Paris MoU are the examples, which has enhanced communication and 
cooperation in recent years, such as the same themes of CIC and similar NIR applied 
one after another. In the long term, a global PSC organization may be established, in 
order to unifying the inspection standards and reducing the iterative inspection. A 
completed PSC PER can play an important role for overcoming the drawbacks of 
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The inspection sample group of Philippines 
 










































4 2006 0 no Vietnam 4 no Japan 3 No 
5 1999 0 no 
Australi
a 
8 no Japan 3 No 











2 no China 3 No 



















11 1993 0 no 
Australi
a 
2 no Chile 0 No 




















15 2008 0 no 
Indonesi
a 
2 no Japan 4 No 







17 2009 0 no 
Philippi
nes 
2 no China 10 no 












20 2008 0 no 
Philippi
nes 
0 no China 1 no 







22 2009 0 no Japan 1 no Japan 1 no 

































The inspection sample group of China 
 




















1 2010 3 no Canada 0 no Canada 0 no 




3 2004 1 no China 5 no Vietnam 3 no 

















7 1995 6 no 
Australi
a 
8 no China 4 no 
8 2011 6 no Vietnam 3 no China 2 no 
















12 2010 0 no China 0 no Japan 1 no 













15 2004 4 no Vietnam 0 no China 14 no 
16 1988 12 yes China 9 no Canada 34 yes 
17 2000 0 no Japan 3 no China 18 no 
18 1983 9 no 
Australi
a 
26 yes China 5 no 
19 2004 13 no China 5 no Japan 9 no 
20 1999 6 no 
Australi
a 
0 no 
Indonesi
a 
0 no 
 
 
 
 
